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Fraud and Internal Control
the efforts of legislators,
DESPITE
government and corporation officials,
and accountants, fraud and embezzlement schemes continue to grow and even
to flourish in infinite variety. The increase in number has been accompanied by
more ingenious and diabolical methods of
effecting and concealing the misappropriations. It is obvious that the business
world must establish every possible safeguard to protect itself against these nefarious schemes. Public accountants can do
much to curb these manipulations. However, to control fraud most effectively, the
business man must help protect himself
by using a good system of internal control
for his organization, and having public
accountants determine at frequent intervals whether the system is effectual.

Most embezzlements within a business
organization have been committed by an
employe who has had access to the company's cash. Consequently, systems of
internal control within some companies
have been designed to give particular attention to the employes connected with the
cash situation, but have failed to take
other employes and their duties into consideration. Recently, however, a case has
come to light in which an employe who had
no access to cash was able to defraud the
company of about $70,000 through a
scheme, crafty and daring in its completeness.
The company's warehouse was in a
different city from that in which the purchasing department and general offices
were situated. The purchasing depart-
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ment's procedure prescribed that requisitions for all needed material and supplies
be sent to the purchasing department;
however, because of general laxness, this
practice was not always followed. Purchase orders were supposed to be prepared
in the purchasing department from the
requisitions. Practically all purchases
were shipped direct to the warehouse, and
all invoices were sent direct to the purchasing department.
Copies of the receiving reports, which
were prepared in duplicate at the warehouse, were forwarded to the purchasing
department. Upon receipt of these copies,
the purchasing agent approved the invoices for payment after verifications and
distribution had been made in his department. The accounting department accepted the approval of the purchasing agent
without further investigation, and prepared
vouchers for the treasurer to pay.
The laxness in the system of internal
control caused by assigning to the purchasing agent the authority to approve
receipt of goods and approve invoices for
payment gave him opportunity for fraud.
His plans for embezzlement show an
unusual amount of care and thoroughness.
He opened offices in several buildings under
the names of bogus companies and hired
employes to attend to them. He opened
bank accounts at various banks for these
same bogus companies. He had invoices
printed with the names of the companies
and had these invoices, representing false
charges, sent for payment to the company
of which he was purchasing agent.
The embezzler forged receiving reports
and attached them to the spurious invoices
which he approved for payment. The fake
invoices together with the forged receiving
reports then were forwarded to the accounting department for entry and payment in
accordance with the usual procedure. The
distribution of the irregular vouchers was
almost entirely to the general ledger ac-
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count—"Warehouse Stock." Checks in
payment of the spurious invoices were sent
to the addresses shown on the invoices, and
were received by the employes of the defaulter and deposited in the banks. The
deposits were subsequently withdrawn by
the purchasing agent.
In an effort to avoid attracting attention
to his manipulations, the embezzler in a
few cases actually had material shipped to
the company's warehouse. Such material
he purchased personally and had it shipped
to the bogus companies, to be reshipped by
them to the company which he was defrauding.
The manipulation was first discovered
after the purchasing agent's resignation
when an employe in the accounting department noticed discrepancies between certain
invoices and receiving reports received subsequent to the defaulter's resignation.
Public accountants were called in to determine the amount of the embezzlement.
This case illustrates the possibilities of
fraud inherent in a situation where one
man not only issues purchase orders, but
also receives material received forms and
approves invoices for payment. In this
case, under a properly operated system of
internal control, the manipulations could
not have been effected, because the receiving reports would have been received
and approved by the accounting department and the discrepancy between the
spurious invoices and the receiving reports
would have been apparent. And, it is
conceivable that certain types of audit
procedure might not have detected the
shortage prior to the purchasing agent's
resignation.
Had the material received forms been
received and the invoices been approved
for payment by some other individual than
the purchasing agent, or someone under
his control, he could not possibly, without
collusion, have carried on his fraudulent
operations undiscovered.
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However, to be effective, a system of
internal check must not only work well on
paper, but must be followed strictly in
actual practice. Someone not an operative
under the system must ascertain at frequent intervals that the system is being
carried out as planned, and that each individual is performing only the task to
which he has been assigned. It should be
the duty of public accountants when they
notice any one employe performing a combination of duties which admit of fraud to
report such conditions to the officers of the
company, even though fraud, in that instance, is not suspected, and even though
the accountants have not been asked to
make comments on the system. Many
times such a warning by the accountant
may lead to further investigation, which
may uncover an unsuspected shortage or
may result in system reform and thus
check potential fraud.
In the case of the manipulations by the
purchasing agent, it is doubtful whether
the fraud would have been uncovered by
restricted audit procedure previous to the
resignation of the defaulter. Full audit
procedure might have revealed an em-
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bezzlement of this type because of an inventory shortage or through a comparison of
the signatures on the material received
forms with the signature of the individual
designated to prepare them. It seems
that in the case in question no book inventory was kept, so that an inventory
shortage did not appear; it was reflected
in an increase in the cost of goods sold.
While it is possible that an accountant
might have discovered the shortage through
a comparison of signatures, nevertheless,
detecting forged signatures is exceedingly
difficult when the forger is proficient. The
accountant would have noticed the increase
in cost of sales if it was relatively large yet
it might have been almost impossible in
this case for him to discover the cause of
such increase. Although the accountant
might not have uncovered the fraud in this
case, he should be expected to report to
the company officials any combination of
duties which in his opinion might be used
to perpetrate fraud. Accountants must
use every precaution possible and be ever
alert to be able to cope successfully with
the "trusted" embezzler whose craftiness
and cunning seem to be eternally increasing.

